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“The potential for systemic risk within the insurance sector needs to be considered where insurers [...] enter into
non-traditional insurance or non-insurance activities.”
Peter Braumu¨ller, Chairman, IAIS Executive Committee, May 31, 2012
1 Introduction
Does the issue of a catastrophe (cat) bond increase or decrease the exposure and contribution
of the issuing insurer to the overall systemic risk of the financial sector? And if so, what character-
istics of the issuer and the issued cat bond drive these changes in the insurer’s systemic relevance?
Since the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the potential of the insurance sector to destabilize the whole
financial system has been discussed controversely.1 On the one hand, both the fact that insurers are
not vulnerable to bank runs of depositors and creditors and the hierarchical interconnectedness of
insurers contradict the notion of systemic risks originating in the insurance sector.2 On the other
hand, for the most part due to the role American International Group (AIG) played during the
crisis, regulators and economists now seem to agree on the potential of insurers becoming system-
ically relevant in case they engage too heavily in non-traditional or non-insurance activities (see,
e.g., Cummins and Weiss, 2010, 2013; International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2012;
Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel, 2013). One example for such non-traditional activities are cat bonds which
are specifically designed to transfer the risk of large catastrophe losses to capital market investors.
Yet while the risk-reducing eﬀect on individual insurers (see Hagendorﬀ et al., 2011) are undis-
puted, the eﬀects of cat bond issues on the issuing insurers’ systemic relevance due to an increased
interconnectedness of investors are still unexplored.
In this paper, we analyze a sample of 176 cat bond issues and show that contrary to current
conjectures of regulators, insurers decrease their contribution to systemic risk through issuing cat
bonds. This eﬀect is economically large as the average cat bond issuer decreases its contribution
(measured by the issuer’s ΔCoVaR, see Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2010) by 3.2%. At the same
1 For discussions of the impact of the financial crisis on the insurance industry and its consequences, see
Bell and Keller (2009) and Eling and Schmeiser (2010).
2 For example, Chen et al. (2012) and Cummins and Weiss (2013) argue that insurers were victims, rather than
contributors during the recent financial crisis.
time, the issuers’ exposure to systemic tail events (measured by the issuer’s Marginal Expected
Shortfall, MES, see Acharya et al., 2010) is not significantly aﬀected by the issue of a cat bond.
After carefully testing the robustness of our key results by controlling for changes in the systemic
relevance of non-issuing insurers, we address the question which characteristics of the issuing
insurers and the issued cat bonds drive these changes in systemic risk. We find that a higher pre-
issue leverage, a higher firm valuation and previous cat bond issues all exert a decreasing eﬀect on
the issuer’s systemic risk contribution.
Catastrophe risk is of major concern to both insurers and reinsurers and over the past decade,
cat bonds have evolved into the instrument of choice for hedging catastrophe risk outside the
traditional reinsurance business. In the first analyses on cat bonds, several authors questioned the
benefits of using cat bonds to hedge underwriting losses (see Froot, 2001; Lakdawalla and Zanjani,
2012; Froot and O’Connell, 2013). For example, early empirical evidence on alternative risk trans-
fer instruments found that insurers purchased only little cat reinsurance due to supply restrictions
and market power exerted by traditional reinsurers (see Froot, 2001). In line with the theoretical
analysis of Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2012), Hagendorﬀ et al. (2013) present empirical evidence
that cat bond issues do not lead to significant abnormal returns for shareholders in issuing firms.
They conclude that market participants prefer cat bonds over other alternatives due to the former
having low costs, but not for their eﬀectiveness for hedging catastrophe risks. Despite these find-
ings, the overall issue volume of cat bonds has grown steadily over the last decade.3 One reason
for the increasing popularity of cat bonds could be their risk-reducing eﬀect on an insurer’s default
probability. In the first empirical study on the risk implications of cat bonds, Hagendorﬀ et al.
(2011) show that cat bonds are eﬀective in hedging underwriting risks and consequently in de-
creasing the ceding insurer’s default risk. The eﬀects of issuing cat bonds on both the issuing
insurer’s systemic risk exposure and contribution, however, remain relatively unexplored in both
the theoretical and empirical literature.
On the one hand, several studies argue that severe natural catastrophes could lead to de-
3 See, e.g., AON Capital Markets (2010) and Carpenter (2012) for recent analyses of the global cat bond market.
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faults of insurers and reinsurers and consequently to the instability of the insurance sector (see
Cummins et al., 2002; Harrington and Niehaus, 2003; Cummins and Trainar, 2009). If the fragility
of the insurance sector spills over to the rest of the financial system (e.g., due to the interconnect-
edness of some systemically important insurers, see Cummins and Weiss, 2010; Chen et al., 2012;
Billio et al., 2012), natural catastrophes could then destabilize the whole financial sector. In this
setting, issuing a cat bond should ceteris paribus decrease an insurer’s exposure to systemic risk
as the issuer is able to transfer and diversify its catastrophe underwriting risk. In addition, the
issuer’s contribution to systemic risk should also decrease if the systemic benefits of reducing the
issuer’s default probability exceed the adverse eﬀect of capital market investors assuming catas-
trophe risk outside the insurance business. On the other hand, insurance regulators have become
increasingly aware of the potential of insurance-linked securities (ILS) to destabilize the insur-
ance sector and the financial system as a whole. Most prominently, the International Association
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) argues in their “Insurance and Financial Stability” report that
although the ILS market simply serves as a distribution mechanism for underwriting risks, the se-
curitization of insurance risks based on poor underwriting may potentially create systemic risks
(see International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2011). Also, the beneficial risk-reducing
eﬀect of a cat bond on the issuing insurer could be outweighed by the detrimental eﬀect of in-
creasing system-wide catastrophe risk exposure. Consequently, the theoretical prediction on the
possible eﬀect of cat bond issues on systemic risk is ambiguous.
Our results show that insurers decrease their contribution to systemic risk via issuing a cat
bond. Contrary to claims by regulators (see International Association of Insurance Supervisors,
2011) and in line with the results found by Hagendorﬀ et al. (2011), cat bond issues are associated
with a risk-reducing eﬀect on issuers. The issuer’s exposure to externalities spilling over from the
financial sector, however, is not significantly aﬀected by a cat bond issue. This result is intuitive
and in line with our expectation. Raising capital and additionally insuring against catastrophe risk
does not significantly aﬀect the issuing insurer’s susceptibility to turmoil in the financial sector. In
our regression analyses we find that leverage and a high firm valuation both exert a disciplining
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influence on the issuer in turn decreasing its contribution to systemic risk. In addition to this,
frequent cat bond issues also appear to have a stabilizing eﬀect on the financial sector.
2 Data and variables
2.1 Sample selection
We start by collecting data on all cat bonds listed on ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm) that were
issued between December 1, 1996 and April 1, 2013.4 In total, our initial sample consists of 284 cat
bonds. We intend to use the insured risk of the cat bonds as an explanatory variable and therefore
omit an issue if its underlying is either not suﬃciently specified (e.g., “all”, “life reinsurance”)
or occurs only once in our sample (“temperature”, “casualty losses”, “event cancellation”, “credit
reinsurance”, “lottery winnings”). This is the case for 13 issues. For similar reasons, we lose
seven issues because of multiple trigger types and four issues lacking information on the trigger
type. Another four issues are excluded due to diﬀerent maturities within their tranches. Since our
investigation is concerned with the systemic relevance of insurers only, we omit from our sample
six issues of non-insurance companies and two cat bonds with unknown cedents.
We check whether the issuer is a publicly listed company and require an insurer to have stock
price data available from Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream to be included in our sample.
Due to this requirement, we lose 66 issues. In addition, we retrieve financial accounting data used
in our cross-sectional study from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. To control for known data errors
in Datastream, we apply several screening procedures for the daily returns on the insurers’ stock
prices that are commonly applied in the empirical literature (see Ince and Porter, 2006). First, we
exclude from our sample days on which the stock price of a respective issuer drops at least once
below a minimum price of US $ 1 to control for a bias induced by the practice in Datastream
of rounding prices. Second, we check whether our sample includes monthly returns above 300%
4 ARTEMIS is, e.g., also used in the study of Gu¨rtler et al. (2012) on the eﬀects of desasters and the financial crisis
on the pricing of cat bonds.
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that are reversed in the following month. If present, such returns are deleted from our sample to
minimize diﬀerences between the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and
Datastream. None of the return series exhibit such data errors. Next, we exclude two issuing
insurers from our sample due to having a stock with zero returns on all days in our sample period
around the issue and announcement dates. Finally, we also exclude non-trading days from our final
sample of stock prices.5
For the remaining 182 issues, we perform various cross-checks using data from ARTEMIS,
LexisNexis, Swiss Re Capital Markets, AON Capital Markets, Guy Carpenter, Cayman Islands
Stock Exchange (www.csx.com.ky) and the firms’ websites for details on the cat bonds’ issue and
announcement dates. Following Hagendorﬀ et al. (2013), we employ both the announcement and
the issue dates in our event study, and in cases where the issue date precedes the announcement
date, we employ the issue date as the announcement date. In six cases we were not able to find
information on the issue date and therefore exclude these from our sample. Our final sample
consists of 176 cat bond issues. For increased transparency, the eﬀect of the various data filters we
apply on the sample of cat bond issues is illustrated in Appendix I. In our final sample, Swiss Re
issued 68 cat bonds during our sample period which makes them the most frequent issuer. Seven
insurers are identified as frequent issuers in our sample. An overview of the distribution of issues
by the insurers can be found in Appendix II.
In the following subsections, we define and discuss the diﬀerent dependent and independent
variables we use in our empirical study. All variables and data sources are defined in Appendix III.
2.2 Measures of Systemic Risk
As our main dependent variables, we employ three diﬀerent measures of systemic risk. These
measures have been extensively discussed in the recent literature (see, e.g., Benoit et al., 2013) and
are also used by regulators for identifying globally systemically important financial institutions.
5 Non-trading days are identified as those days on which the ten largest insurance companies (with respect to their
market capitalization) in a respective country available in Datastream exhibit a stock return equal to zero.
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The first measure we use in our study is the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) as proposed by
Acharya et al. (2010). It is defined as the negative mean of the log returns on an individual issuer’s
stocks, conditional on the financial sector experiencing its worst 5% outcomes with positive values
for MES indicating a larger exposure to adverse eﬀects spilling over from the financial sector (and
vice versa). In our estimations, we make use of the dynamic model specification of MES presented
by Brownlees and Engle (2012), which allows for time varying volatility and correlations in the
equity returns of individual financial institutions and the sector index.6 We first compute daily
dynamic MES estimates in the two periods with a length of 180 trading days before and after the
event date of a cat bond issue. Next, the daily MES estimates are averaged in both periods around
the issue event to yield a pre-issue and post-issue estimate of the issuer’s exposure to systemic
risk. The change in the MES around the cat bond issue is then used as a dependent variable in our
cross-sectional regressions.
Next, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) in their definition and estimation of the
conditional ΔCoVaR to measure an insurer’s contribution to systemic risk. In their study,
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) define a financial institution’s CoVaR as the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
of the financial system conditional on institutions being under distress. An issuer’s contribution
to system risk is then measured as the diﬀerence between CoVaR conditional on the issuer being
under distress and the CoVaR in the median state of the institution.7
The third measure we implement is the Systemic Risk Index (SRISK), defined by Acharya et al.
(2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) that tries to measure the expected capital shortfall of an
issuer in a crisis by incorporating the dynamic MES in a measure of the institution’s debt. The
6 To be precise, the joint behavior of the market and firm returns are modeled with the TARCH (see
Rabemananjara and Zakoı¨an, 1993) and DCC (see Engle, 2002) specifications.
7 Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), we employ the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, the
diﬀerence between the ten-year Treasury Bond and the three-month Treasury bill rate, the change in the credit
spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury bill rate, the return on the Case-Shiller Home Price Index,
and implied equity market volatility from VIX as state variables in the estimation of each issuer’s conditional
ΔCoVaR around cat bond issues.
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SRISK estimate for issuer i at time t is given by
S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
) − (1 − k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t (1)
where k is a regulatory capital ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the issuer’s book value of debt, LRMES i,t
is the long run Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 − exp(−18 · dynMES ), dynMES is the
dynamically estimated MES and Equityi,t is the issuer’s market value of equity. Similar to the
MES and ΔCoVaR, we compute an issuer’s SRISK for the periods with a length of 180 trading
days before and after the event date of an issue and then employ the diﬀerences in our regressions.
2.3 Insurer Characteristics
For our first set of independent variables, we choose several indicators of systemic relevance
suggested by the IAIS for detecting systemically important insurers.8 An insurer’s size is expected
to influence significantly its contribution and exposure to systemic risk. As a proxy of an insurer’s
size, we use the logarithm of its’ total assets. On the one hand, we expect the coeﬃcient of total
assets in our regression to be positively correlated with systemic risk exposure and contribution,
since a larger company is less likely to suﬀer from cumulative losses due to its broader range of
diﬀerent risks insured. On the other hand, an insurance company could become more systemically
relevant by being too-interconnected-to-fail (see, e.g., Acharya et al., 2009). As an alternative
proxy for an insurer’s size, we also employ the variable Net revenues, which is the log value of the
issuer’s total operating revenues.
Next, we include in our regressions the variable Non-policyholder liabilities. It is defined as the
diﬀerence of the total of balance sheet liabilities and total insurance reserves (including benefit and
loss reserves, unearned premiums, policy and contract claims and other reserves) and is therefore
used to capture an insurer’s activity outside the classical insurance business. Furthermore, we sus-
pect an increase in the contribution of an issuer to systemic risk, if the issuer is more intertwined
8 Note that not all indicators proposed by the IAIS can be used in our study as several of their variables are based
on confidential firm data that are unavailable to us.
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with global financial markets. To proxy for this, we define an issuer’s Investment activity as the ab-
solute value of investment income divided by the sum of the absolute values of investment income
and earned premiums. This ratio proxies the degree with which the insurer derives its income from
investing in assets rather than earning premiums from underwriting. In addition, we include the
variable Investment success which is defined as an insurer’s investment income divided by its’ net
revenues.
We also employ several other variables concerning diﬀerent insurer characteristics. By follow-
ing Acharya et al. (2010) and Fahlenbrach et al. (2012), we obtain an approximation to an issuer’s
leverage by taking the ratio of the quasi-market value of assets and the market value of equity. The
quasi-market value of assets is simply given by the book value of assets plus the market value of
equity minus the book value of equity. The sign of the coeﬃcient of leverage in our regression is
expected to be unrestricted. Vallascas and Hagendorﬀ (2011) argue that managers of companies
with high leverage could feel pressured by investors to provide enough liquid assets to cover the
payment of interests. As a consequence, a higher leverage might decrease an insurer’s total risk.
At the same time, high leverage is a factor that could force managers into having an aﬃnity for
excessively taking on more risk to increase a firm’s profitability. Support for this view is found by
Acharya et al. (2010), Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) and Hovakimian et al. (2012) who find empirical
evidence for better firm performance and a smaller contribution to systemic risk by banks with low
leverage during the crisis.
In addition, we take an insurer’s market-to-book ratio, defined as the book value of common
equity divided by the market value of common equity, as an independent variable. Since an over-
valuation of an insurance company might set up for high growth expectations on the part of in-
vestors, we suspect a negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio and systemic risk. As
before, overstated growth expectations could also lead to more risk-taking by managers (see, e.g.,
Milidonis and Stathopoulos, 2011).
The next insurer-specific variable we consider is Debt maturity, which is defined as the ratio of
total long-term debt and total debt. Since previous studies have found that a financial institution’s
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use of short-term funding led to higher exposure to systemic risk during the financial crisis (see,
e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), we expect a higher value of Debt maturity to decrease an
insurer’s exposure to systemic risk.9
As pointed out in De Haan and Kakes (2007), a higher profitability of an insurer is related to
decreases in its contribution to systemic risk. This is because insurance companies with higher
profits also have higher solvency margins and a lower risk of insolvency. To capture an insurer’s
profitability, we use the variable Return on assets at the end of the year before the cat bond was
issued. To further check whether an issuer’s performance before the announcement of a cat bond
issue has an eﬀect on the issuer’s systemic risk, we define the variable Performance as the buy-
and-hold returns (in %) of an insurer for the period from 252 to 20 days before the announcement
date. We would expect a good performance to decrease an insurer’s exposure and contribution to
systemic risk (see also Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). As another proxy for an issuer’s overall perfor-
mance, we also employ its loss ratio calculated by adding claim and loss expenses and long term
insurance reserves and then dividing the sum by premiums earned. We suspect a higher contri-
bution to systemic risk by issuers that have a higher loss ratio and thus a better quality of their
insurance portfolio.
Inspired by Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Aebi et al. (2012), who find that poor governance
influenced the severity of losses that banks suﬀered during the financial crisis, we include the two
variables Board size and Board independence in our cross-sectional analyses. We define Board size
as the natural logarithm of the number of directors on an insurer’s board. Yermack (1996) shows
that larger boards tend to destroy firm value and possibly capital buﬀers, which is why we suspect
a positive relation between Board size and systemic risk. Board independence is the percentage
of independent outside directors on the board of directors. As a proxy for independence on the
insurer’s board of directors, we expect a decreasing impact on the systemic risk of an insurer, since
outside directors should have more concerns about a financial sector’s risk as a whole.
We also include information on the accounting standards used by an issuer as a control variable.
9 Note that we use long-term debt instead of short-term debt to calculate our variable Debt maturity
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Therefore, we take the variable IFRS which takes on the value of integers from one to 23 where
one means that the insurer reports according to local standards and 23 that they use the guidelines
of IFRS. The numbers in between correspond to diﬀerent variations of national and international
reporting standards (details on the coding of this variable can be found in the documentation of the
Worldscope database).
The final two idiosyncratic variables take into account how often a single insurer has issued
a catastrophe bond. A bigger number of issues might lead to a higher contribution and exposure
to systemic risk, since the insurer is then more intertwined with the global financial market. We
therefore follow Hagendorﬀ et al. (2013) and use the number of previous cat bond issues under-
taken by the issuer as an independent variable, as well as the dummy variable Frequent issuer,
which equals one, if the insurer has issued five or more cat bonds during the observation period
and zero otherwise.
2.4 Catastrophe Bond Characteristics
Our second set of independent variables addresses the design features of the issued catastrophe
bonds. First, we employ the variable Issue size defined as the total value of an issued cat bond
divided by the ceding insurer’s book value of equity. In our regressions, we expect the coeﬃcient
of Issue size to be unrestricted. On the one hand, an insurer becomes more exposed to systemic
risk by taking on more debt through issuing a cat bond. On the other hand, the primary motivation
for an insurer to issue a cat bond is its intention to insure against severe losses due to extreme
events. Issue size could therefore also be negatively correlated with systemic risk. One could also
argue that a longer maturity of a cat bond increases the exposure and contribution of the issuer to
systemic risk. Therefore, we use the maturity of the cat bond expressed in month in our regressions
as a further independent variable.
A cat bond can be characterized by a wide range of trigger types, such as index, parametric and
indemnity triggers. A full protection against occurring losses caused by catastrophes is given by the
latter trigger type. We intend to answer the question whether the type of the trigger has a significant
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impact on the eﬀect of cat bond issues on systemic risk. Consequently, we use the dummy variable
Indemnity, which equals one if the cat bond uses an indemnity-based trigger and zero otherwise.
As mentioned in Hagendorﬀ et al. (2013), indemnity-based triggers suﬀer from higher transaction
costs and moral hazard problems, since an issuer might be better informed about the covered risk.
Due to this, we predict the Indemnity variable to be positively correlated with the changes in the
issuers’ systemic relevance.
Another design feature of a cat bond that might drive the issuer’s systemic risk exposure and
contribution around the issue dates is its rating given by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. First,
we follow Hagendorﬀ et al. (2011, 2013) and convert a cat bond’s rating into a numerical value by
assigning the number one to issues rated as AAA by S&P (or Aaa by Moody’s), two to issues rated
as AA+ (Aa1), and so forth. Since an issue is often divided into several tranches with diﬀerent
ratings, we consolidate the ratings of the diﬀerent tranches by calculating their weighted average
(weighted by amount of US $ in the tranches). A higher value of this variable Rating (a lower
rating by S&P) could indicate a greater probability that the cat bond trigger gets activated. We
therefore suspect Rating to have an increasing eﬀect on the issuer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Finally, we employ in our regressions the control variable Secured risk, which is equal to one if
the cat bond covers mortality-related risks or medical benefit claims and zero otherwise.
2.5 Country Characteristics
To control for diﬀerences in the ceding insurer’s countries, we use several macroeconomic and
country-level control variables. First, we include in our regressions the variable Inflation, defined
as the natural logarithm of the annual change in inflation rate. Shiu (2004) finds evidence for a
negative relation between inflation and insurer and bank performance. We therefore expect an in-
crease in the contribution to systemic risk, a result which is also found by Bernoth and Pick (2011).
Additionally, we use the growth rate of the GDP as a standard macroeconomic control variable. To
proxy for a country’s shareholder protection rights, we use the Anti-Director Rights Index intro-
duced by La Porta et al. (1999) and revised by Djankov et al. (2008) and Spamann (2010).
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Another country-specific variable we employ is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) to
measure for the competition in a country’s insurance sector. It is defined as the sum of the squared
market shares of all insurers based in a country. Uhde and Heimeshoﬀ (2009) find evidence for
a negative eﬀect of the HHI on systemic risk, whereas Beck et al. (2006) conclude the contrary.
Therefore, we have no prediction for the influence of the HHI on systemic risk in our regressions.
For each country we also employ the Political Stability index from the Worldbank’s World
Development Indicator database, which measures the perceptions of the likelihood that unconsti-
tutional or violent actions destabilize or overthrow the government. A higher value indicates a
more stable political governance. Finally, we include an index for the local reinsurance market
in a specific country, which could be a driving factor for an insurer’s need for alternative risk-
securitization. For each issue we take the Reinsurance prices from the ceding insurer’s country in
the year the cat bond was issued. Data on reinsurance prices are obtained from Guy Carpenter.
2.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table I shows descriptive statistics for our independent variables and the estimated systemic
risk measures. As dependent variables in our regressions, we employ the changes in SRISK, MES
and ΔCoVaR around cat bond issue dates.
- Insert Table I here -
The statistics given in Table I show that cat bond issues do not coincide with an economically or
statistically significant change in the average issuer’s SRISK. In line with our expectation, however,
the issuers’ exposure to systemic risk decreases considerably after the issue of a cat bond. As
evidenced by the decrease of -1.04% in the issuers’ MES, issuing insurers appear to decrease their
vulnerability to externalities spilling over from the financial sector. Similarly, we can see from
the mean change in ΔCoVaR that the contribution of the issuing insurers to systemic risk also
decreases. Mean ΔCoVaR increases by 3.44%. This first analysis thus first hints at the possibility
that cat bond issues could have a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing eﬀect on the financial sector.
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Concerning the insurer characteristics, several aspects deserve to be highlighted. The total
assets of the insurers in our sample are between 0.90 and 1,350.21 billion US $ and the average
and median are 207.82 and 143.94 billion US $, respectively. The mean return on assets of issuers
in our sample is positive. Furthermore, issuers in our sample also have positive mean values for
our variables Investment success, Investment activity and Performance. The mean issuer in our
sample also has approximately 29% non-policyholder liabilities and a mean loss ratio of 85%.
The distribution of the cat bond issues in our sample over time is depicted in Figure 1.
- Insert Figure 1 here -
We can see that from 1997 to 2002, only few cat bonds were issued each year, whereas in 2003
and the following years we find a significant surge in the number of annual issues by insurers. In
2006, a total of 27 Cat bonds in our sample were issued, which is the highest number of yearly
issues. This is followed up by a dramatic decrease in 2008 and an upward trend of the issuing
frequency. Concerning the size of the issues, the plot in Figure 1 shows that the value size of the
issues follows a similar trend. The average volume of catastrophe bond issues is 153.17 million
US $ per year, with a range from six to 550.25 million US $. The percentage of the issues that used
indemnity-based triggers is 8% and we can also see that 6% of the observations secured mortality-
related risks or medical benefit claims. On average, the maturity of a cat bond was around three
years and one month with the shortest period being twelve months and the longest maturity being
almost six years. Table I also reveals that the average rating assigned to a cat bond was BB- (S&P).
3 Empirical study
In this section, we present the results of the systemic risk estimates of cat bond issuing insur-
ance companies and matched non-issuing insurance companies and then turn to the cross-sectional
analysis of our three systemic risk measures around cat bond issues.
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3.1 Systemic Risk Eﬀects
Results on the cat bond issue-related changes in the three measures of systemic risk are pre-
sented in Table II.
- Insert Table II here -
For our full-sample analysis, we first estimate cat bond related changes in the issuers’ SRISK.10
We find only little evidence for a statistically significant increase in SRISK. More precisely, is-
suers’ exposure to global systemic risk measured by SRISK increases though the change in SRISK
is neither statistically nor economically significant. This first result is rather intriguing as the (auto-
matic) increase in the issuer’s contribution to systemic risk due to the increase in total debt appears
to be oﬀset by the stabilizing eﬀect of the cat bond issue on the issuer’s equity (i.e., the dynamic
MES).
The results of our second systemic risk measure (dynamic MES) show that cat bond issuers
statistically significantly decrease their exposure to systemic risk by -0.9 %. This eﬀect is also
economically significant as the issuers’ equity returns in times of market crisis increase by almost
one per cent. Cat bonds are used as an eﬀective hedging instrument of issuers’ underwriting
risk. Consequently, and in line with the results of Hagendorﬀ et al. (2011) on the default risk
implications of cat bonds, we find issuers to decrease their susceptibility to spillover eﬀects from
the financial sector.
The results for the ΔCoVaR estimates in Table II underline our previous finding that as a con-
sequence of the cat bond issue, the issuing insurers decrease their contribution to overall systemic
risk. Although this result is not statistically significant, the eﬀect is nevertheless economically
large. The ΔCoVaR of the average issuer increases by 3.2% around the cat bond issue. A natu-
ral explanation for this finding is that the decrease in the issuing insurers’ default probability due
to the hedging of catastrophe risks has a significant stabilizing eﬀect on the financial sector. In
10 We also include several cat bond issues in this analysis for which we do not have data on all accounting variables.
Consequently, the sample size in this analysis is slightly larger than in the previous analysis documented in Table
I.
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contrast, this stabilizing eﬀect does not seem to be outweighed by the destabilizing side-eﬀect of
capital market investors assuming catastrophe risks and thus increasing interconnectedness.
It could be argued that the changes we find in the three systemic risk measures are not due to
the insurers issuing cat bonds but to some unobserved sector-wide trend that aﬀects all insurers.
To investigate the question whether the contributon or exposure to systemic risk is diﬀerent for
issuing and non-issuing insurance companies, we employ a matching approach using propensity
scores and compare the systemic risk eﬀects for issuers and matching non-issuers. We aim to
match a non-issuing insurer to a similar cat bond issuing insurer of similar size. To be precise, we
follow Drucker and Puri (2005), Bartram et al. (2011) and Bartram et al. (2012) and use propen-
sity score technique to compare insurance companies along one dimension, i.e., the insurer’s total
assets.11 We employ the size of the insurer in our matching of issuers and non-issuers as it has
been frequently stated by both the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2012) and
found by empirical studies (see, e.g., Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel, 2013) that insurer size is the key driver
of systemic risk in insurance. The matching is done by first estimating a logit-regression with the
dependent variable diﬀerentiating between issuing and non-issuing insurers and our matching vari-
able total assets. Next, we follow the “nearest-neighbor” technique which minimizes the estimated
propensity scores of our cat bond issuing insurers and corresponding non-issuers. For each cat
bond issue, we develop a matching conditional that the non-issuing insurer has his headquarters
in the same country as the issuer and stock market and balance sheet data readily available from
Thomson Reuters.
Table III presents the results of our systemic risk measures for cat bond issuing and non-issuing
insurance companies.
- Insert Table III here -
To ensure a good matching quality, we only consider matched insurer pairs with statistically
insignificant diﬀerences between the issuing and the non-issuing insurers’ propensity scores. Con-
11 We also perform a matching of issuers and non-issuers along two dimensions using the insurers’ size and leverage.
This analysis is not successful due to the bad quality of the resulting matching.
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sequently, the total number of cat bond issues we analyze in this part of our investigation is reduced
to 110, 119 and 121 issues, respectively.
The results for our first systemic risk measure (SRISK) show that cat bond issuers decrease
their exposure to systemic risk, although this eﬀect is not statistically significant. Conversely,
SRISK increases slightly for the matching non-issuing insurers. However, the diﬀerence in the
issue-related change in SRISK between issuers and matching non-issuers is neither statistically
nor economically significant.
Next, we investigate whether the reduction in the issuers’ exposure to systemic risk is genuinely
caused by the issue of a cat bond or rather by sector-wide eﬀects. The results for the dynamic
MES show that issuing insurers decrease their exposure to systemic risk by 1.1% although this
economically significant change is not statistically significant. However, non-issuing insurance
companies also experience an economically significant decrease in their exposure to systemic risk
(-1.6%). The diﬀerence between the changes in the MES of issuers and non-issuers, nevertheless,
is not significant. We thus find no empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that cat bond
issues significantly aﬀect the issuer’s exposure to systemic crises.
Most interestingly, our findings for the ΔCoVaR of issuers and non-issuers show that the con-
tribution of non-issuers to systemic risk around cat bond issues does not significantly change. At
the same time, the contribution of issuing insurers to systemic risk is economically significantly
reduced by almost 4.3%. Consequently, our results strongly support the hypothesis that cat bond
issues add to the stability rather than the fragility of the financial sector.
3.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions of Systemic Risk
We now turn to the results of our cross-sectional analysis to determine which factors can ex-
plain both the cat bond issuers’ contribution as well as exposure to systemic tail events. There-
fore, we estimate several regression models using the changes between the cat bond issuers’ pre-
announcement and post-issue SRISK, dynamic MES and ΔCoVaR as our main dependent vari-
ables.
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As our dependent variables stem from a first-stage estimation, our regression-models could suf-
fer both from heteroskedasticity as well as inconsistent standard error estimates. We therefore esti-
mate our regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Newey-West standard errors to con-
trol for heteroskedasticity and possible autocorrelation. We use three sets of cross-sectional OLS
regressions to answer the question which insurer-specific, cat bond-specific or country-specific
variables have an influence on the issue-related changes in systemic risk. To mitigate the problem
that our systemic risk measures and some regressors could be determined simultaneously, we use
pre-announcement explanatory variables lagged by one quarter. Additionally, we estimate a set
of diﬀerent regression-model specifications controlling for the insurers’ board structure, invest-
ment activity and loss ratio to assess our regressions’ sensitivity to the inclusion of these control
variables. Correlations between our regressors are presented in Table IV.
- Insert Table IV here -
Table IV shows that there exist some variable pairs which could cause multicollinearity prob-
lems in our regressions. These highly correlated variables are not used simulataneously in the
regressions we describe in the following. Table V reports the results of the regressions on Cat
bond issuer-related changes in SRISK, dynamic MES and ΔCoVaR.
- Insert Table V here -
Model (1) constitutes our baseline regression in which we use our full-sample of issuing in-
surance companies. We find no evidence pointing at a significant relation between the issuers’
size and their exposure to systemic risk. More precisely, insurer size which is measured by the
logarithm of the insurers’ total assets has a positive but not statistically significant eﬀect on the
cat bond issuers’ changes in SRISK. The changes in the exposure to systemic risk are thus not
determined by the pre-issue level of insurer size. Additionally, the pre-announcement market-to-
book value enters regression (1) with a statistically significant negative coeﬃcient. Insurers with
a higher market-to-book value and therefore with a higher charter value could provide managers
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incentives to increase their capital ratios and consequently limit their risk-taking. This eﬀect can
decrease the insurers’ default probability thus decreasing the issuers’ exposure to systemic risk.
This eﬀect is also economically significant with a one standard deviation increase in the market-
to-book value causing a decrease of 140 million US $ (1.838 × 0.763) in SRISK. Additionally, it
could be argued that diﬀerences in issuers’ accounting standards could have a significant impact on
any of our systemic risk measures. The variable IFRS enters regression (1) both with a statistically
as well as an economically significant negative coeﬃcient. We find consistent evidence that issuers
reporting their results following IFRS decrease their SRISK.
Turning to the cat bond characteristics, most of our variables enter regression (1) with a statis-
tically significant coeﬃcient. Issue size, which is defined as the value of an issued cat bond scaled
by the ceding insurers’ book value of equity, enters our regression with a significant positive co-
eﬃcient. On the one hand, the insurers’ leverage increases due to taking on more debt through
the cat bond issue which has a significant eﬀect on SRISK which is computed from the insurers’
total debt. On the other hand, a larger issue does not necessarily provide issuers with more diver-
sification benefits, which could have a positive impact on SRISK. This result is also economically
significant as a one standard deviation increase in the issue size results in a 224 million US $ (0.019
× 118.361) increase in SRISK. Moreover, the dummy variable Indemnity, which equals one if the
cat bond uses an indemnity-based trigger and zero otherwise, has a statistically significant positive
eﬀect on SRISK. This result could be explained with the moral hazard problem caused by better
informed issuers exploiting unsuspecting investors. More precisely, issuers could be inclined to
issue high-risk bonds to investors thus increasing systemic risk in the whole financial sector. Ad-
ditionally, the variable secured risk is significantly negatively related to SRISK. Secured risk is a
dummy variable that takes on the value one if the cat bond securitizes mortality-related risks or
medical benefit claims and zero otherwise. This means that non-life insurance cat-bonds trigger
seem to aﬀect SRISK diﬀerently than cat bonds used for hedging underwriting losses in life insur-
ance. This eﬀect is also economically significant. Finally, our country-specific variables show that
a higher GDP growth and a higher sector concentration have a negative impact on SRISK.
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In regression (2), we control for the sensitivity of our results. Due to a possible bias in our
estimates due to multicollinearity between total assets and both leverage as well as investment
activity, we exclude total assets and reestimate our previous regression including also the insurers’
loss ratio. Most importantly, issuer leverage enters regression (2) with a statistically significant
positive coeﬃcient. However, one could argue that the positive correlation between SRISK and
leverage is an automatic consequence of the fact that issuers raise their leverage by means of a cat
bond issue (and thus their total debt included in SRISK). The results for our cat bond characteristics
as well as country characteristics remain qualitatively unchanged.
In regression (3), we consider the issuers’ board structure in our estimations by including both
Board size as well as Board independence as additional variables. The significance of the coeﬃ-
cient on the issuers’ leverage remains unchanged. As an additional insurer characteristic variable,
investment activity enters our regression with a significant negative coeﬃcient. The relation be-
tween investment activity, which is a proxy for the insurers’ interconnectedness with the global
financial markets, and SRISK indicates that issuers’ deriving their income from investing in assets
rather than in earning premiums from underwritings decrease their exposure to systemic risk. This
result may seem counterintuitive at first. However, insurers engaging more in investment activities
could increase their profitability thus decreasing SRISK through diversification benefits. An un-
reported regression, using investment success instead of investment activity, confirms our results.
In line with our previous findings, the variable Return on assets is also statistically significant
implying that more profitable issuers can decrease their SRISK due to the cat bond issue. This
relation is also economically significant with a one standard deviation increase in Return on assets
increasing the change in SRISK by 199 million US $ (1.486 × 1.34). Additionally, the insurers’
performance has a statistically significant negative impact on SRISK. This result implies that a
better performance measured by the pre-announcement buy-and-hold returns, results in a decrease
in SRISK. An increase in the lagged buy-and-hold returns by a one standard deviation leads to a
decrease in SRISK of 258 million US $ (10.718 × 0.241). Issuers that performed better in the pre
cat bond issue period thus reduce their exposure to systemic risk. The variable IFRS is no longer
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statistically significant but remains economically significant.
The coeﬃcients of the board structure are not statistically but economically significant. On the
one hand, board size has a positive impact on SRISK, due to the fact that larger boards tend to
destroy firm value and possible capital buﬀers thus leading to an increase in SRISK. On the other
hand, higher board independence has a negative impact on SRISK, since outside directors might
have more concerns about a financial sectors’ risk as a whole. Finally, the high adjusted R-squared
values for our regressions using SRISK as our dependent variable show that a large portion of
issue-related changes in issuers’ SRISK can be explained by our set of independent variables.
The second set of regression models uses the insurers’ issue-related changes in dynamic MES
as the dependent variable. Again, regression (1) constitutes our baseline regression in which we
use our full-sample of cat bond issues. Regression (1) shows that among the insurer characteristics,
non-policyholder liabilities enter our regression with a significant negative sign. Non-policyholder
liabilities are used to proxy for the insurers’ financing activity outside the classical insurance busi-
ness. The negative correlation between MES and non-policyholder liabilities result is economically
significant since a one standard deviation increase in non-policyholder liabilities decreases the in-
surers’ dynamic MES by 1.12% (0.080 × 0.140). Moreover, issue size enters our regression with
a statistically significant negative coeﬃcient which implies that large cat bond issues provide the
issuers with more diversification benefits resulting in a decreased probability of default. Addi-
tionally, cat bonds covering mortality-related risks or medical benefit claims result in an increased
exposure of the insurers’ dynamic MES, though this eﬀect is only weakly statistically significant.
In regression (2), we control for both the issuers’ leverage as well as investment activity and
exclude total assets. The results for our insurer characteristics show that both performance and
IFRS have a significant positive eﬀect on dynamic MES. One explanation could be that a better
performance in the past could have increased stock volatility and therefore the exposure to systemic
risk. Turning to cat bond related characteristics, indemnity-trigger based cat bond issues enter our
regression with a statistically negative coeﬃcient. This implies that an issuer of a cat bond using
an indemnity-based trigger is well informed about the covered risks and could therefore reduce his
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exposure to overall systemic risk.
Again, model (3) includes the insurers’ board structure and board independence as additional
control variables. Most importantly, the results on non-policyholder liabilities as well as return
on assets remain unchanged compared to of our previous estimations. Further, the issuers’ invest-
ment activity has a statistically significant positive eﬀect on dynamic MES. This result implicates
that issuers investing more in assets rather than earning premiums from underwritings suﬀer from
an increased exposure to systemic risk stemming from worldwide capital markets. Otherwise,
the results for our cat bond related and country-specific variable estimates remain qualitatively
unchanged.
Finally, we use the changes in ΔCoVaR as the dependent variable for our final set of regres-
sion models. We analyze, which factors help explain the issuing insurers’ contribution to global
systemic risk. Again, we consider the same set of independent variables as in our previous regres-
sions. In regression (1), however, issuer size does not have a significant eﬀect on the contribution
of systemic risk, which indicates that size is neither a reasonable factor to determine the insurers’
exposure nor the insurers’ contribution to overall systemic risk. Turning to the insurers’ prof-
itability, the estimate for the variable Return on assets shows that higher issuer profitability has a
statistically significant negative impact on the insurers’ contribution to systemic risk. This relation
is also highly economically significant with a one standard deviation increase in Return on assets
increasing the change in ΔCoVaR by 0.26% (0.001 × 2.62). Moreover, performance enters our
regression with a statistically significant negative coeﬃcient which means that a good pre-issue
performance increases the insurers’ contribution to systemic risk. One possible explanation could
be that a better stock performance is indicative of an increased risk taking by the insurer causing it
to contribute more to systemic risk.
Interestingly, none of our cat bond characteristics can help explain the insurers’ contribution to
systemic risk. With regard to the country-characteristics, a higher GDP growth leads to an increase
in ΔCoVaR and thus a decrease in the issuer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Regression (2) constitutes the regression with the issuers’ leverage, investment activity and
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excludes total assets due to multicollinearity problems. Consistent with our previous estimation
results, a negative relation between the issuers’ valuation and systemic risk can be found. The
coeﬃcient on the market-to-book value shows that an increase in the issuers’ valuation leads to a
decrease in ΔCoVaR. This eﬀect is statistically and economically significant. Moreover, a higher
leverage has a negative impact on the systemic risk contribution of issuers. It thus seems that
leverage has a disciplining eﬀect on managers, rather than a destabilizing eﬀect on the finan-
cial sector due to increased risk-taking by the individual firm. Moreover, an increase in non-
policyholder liabilities has a positive eﬀect on the insurers’ contribution to systemic risk. This
result is in line with the findings of International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2012) and
Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2013). Again, performance has a positive eﬀect on the insurers’ contribu-
tion to systemic risk.
For the first time, the variable Loss ratio also enters our regressions with a significant negative
coeﬃcient. The issuers’ loss ratio characterizes the quality of an insurance portfolio. We find that
a higher loss ratio leads to a higher contribution to overall systemic risk by the issuing insurer.
Also, previous issues seem to significantly aﬀect the issuers’ contribution to systemic risk. This
variable enters our regression with a statistically significant positive coeﬃcient and implies that
insurers that have issued a large number of cat bonds in the past (and that are consequently more
intertwined with the international financial markets) do not increase their contribution to systemic
risk by means of a cat bond issue. Turning to the cat bond related variables, issue size enters the
regression with a statistically significant negative coeﬃcient and secured risk with a statistically
significant positive coeﬃcient. Both results are in line with the estimation results from regression
(1) with the issue-related change in SRISK as our dependent variable.
The results for our country characteristics show that the Anti-Director Rights Index which
is a proxy for shareholder protection enters our regression with a statistically significant posi-
tive coeﬃcient. Insurers issuing cat bonds in countries with a higher shareholder protection can
thus significantly decrease their contribution to systemic risk. Finally, regression (3) confirms
our results for the insurer characteristics from regression (2). Additionally, the insurers’ invest-
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ment activity increases the contribution to systemic risk. This result is in line with the findings
of Weiß and Mu¨hlnickel (2013). Also, board size enters our regression with a statistically signif-
icant negative coeﬃcient. Therefore, a larger board size tends to destroy firm value and possible
capital buﬀers which results in insurers having a higher contribution to systemic risk. Again, the
significantly higher adjusted R-squared values for our regressions using ΔCoVaR as our depen-
dent variable show that a large portion of the cross-sectional variation in issue-related changes in
issuers’ ΔCoVaR can be explained by our set of independent variables.
Finally, we also estimate unreported regressions in which we include the maturity of the cat
bonds, reinsurance prices, the maturity of the issuers’ debt, the dummy variable for frequent is-
suers and the inflation rate. Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones
reported in Table V. In fact, several of these additional regressions are not successful due to sig-
nificant multicollinearity. We also estimate regressions in which we substitute Total assets by Net
revenues and Investment activity by Investment success. Our results remain unchanged. We also
note that the linear correlation between the changes in MES and in ΔCoVaR is statistically insignif-
icant. Followingly, both measures genuinely appear to measure two diﬀerent aspects of an issuing
insurer’s systemic relevance: its exposure to systemic risk on the one hand, and its contribution to
systemic fragility on the other hand.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical assessment of claims that cat bond issues add to the
contribution of the issuing insurer to the fragility of the financial sector. Theory provides inconclu-
sive predictions regarding the relation between cat bond financing and systemic risk. On the one
hand, cat bond issues enable the issuer to decrease its default risk as its susceptibility to catastro-
phe losses is reduced. Consequently, as defaults in the insurance industry become less likely, the
financial sector as a whole should become more stable. On the other hand, cat bonds increase the
interconnectedness of the issuer with other firms outside the insurance industry and consequently
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increase the counterparty risk present in the financial sector. Cat bonds could thus also contribute
to increased levels of systemic risk, a view that is shared by insurance regulators seeking to reform
the supervision of insurers in the wake of the near-collapse of AIG. We address these questions
by analyzing a global sample of 176 cat bond issues that took place between December 1996 and
April 2013 and by employing three measures of an issuing insurer’s systemic relevance (SRISK,
MES and ΔCoVaR) that capture both the insurer’s exposure and contribution to systemic risk.
Our key result is in striking contrast to current conjectures of insurance regulators. Cat bond is-
sues lead to economically significant decreases in the average issuer’s contribution to systemic risk.
Thus, cat bonds contribute to the stability of the financial sector rather than destabilize it. Con-
versely, cat bond issues do not significantly aﬀect an insurer’s exposure to externalities spilling
over from other financial institutions during times of market turmoil. In addition to the positive
side-eﬀects on the issuers’ individual default risk that has already been documented in the liter-
ature, we find additional evidence of a systemically stabilizing eﬀect of these insurance-linked
securities. This result holds when controlling for the systemic risk eﬀects of non-issuing insurers.
Our second key finding is that a higher pre-issue leverage, a higher firm valuation and previous cat
bond issues all exert a decreasing eﬀect on the issuer’s systemic risk contribution.
The findings in this paper imply that insurance regulators, most notably the IAIS, should not
penalize the use of cat bond financing with higher capital requirements as part of their endeavour
to supervise globally systemically important insurers.
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Appendix I: Sample Construction
The table shows the isolated impact of each single data filter we apply on our initial sample of cat bond issues as
well as the combined eﬀect of all filters. The initial sample is constructed by first selecting all insurers that issued
cat bonds between December 1st, 1996 and April 1st, 2013. Data on cat bond issues are taken from ARTEMIS
(www.artemis.bm). We apply a number of screens to focus on cat bonds issues with single and clearly specified
triggers. We exclude issues where the underlying is not suﬃciently specified or where the underlying type occurs only
once in our sample. Further, we exclude issues with multiple trigger types, diﬀerent maturities within tranches, and
issues of non-insurance companies. Cat bond issues with unknown cedent or missing data on the trigger type are also
excluded. We only consider issues for which the issuing insurer has quarterly accounting data in Thomson Reuters
Worldscope and diurnal stock price data in Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream.
Sample / Filter Number of cat bond issues % Lost
Full sample (www.artemis.bm) 284
Firms lost in single screens
Insuﬃcient specification of underlying 8 2.8%
Underlying type occurs only once 5 1.8%
Cat bond has multiple triggers 7 2.5%
No information on trigger available 4 1.4%
Cat bond has diﬀerent maturities within tranches 4 1.4%
Cat bond issuer is a non-insurance company 6 2.1%
Cedent of cat bond is unknown 2 0.7%
Missing stock price data in Datastream 66 23.2%
Missing data on issue date 6 2.1%
Firms lost in combined screens 108 38.0%
Final Sample 176
Sum of cat bond issue size (in $ billion)
Full sample 49.3233 100.0%
Lost in combined screens 21.6204 43.8%
Final sample 27.7029 56.2%
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Appendix II: Sample insurance companies.
The appendix lists all insurance companies that are used in the empirical study as well as the number of cat bond
issues by a respective insurer. The sample is constructed by first selecting all insurers that issued cat bonds between
December 1st, 1996 and April 1st, 2013 and then applying filters as described in Section 2. Data on cat bond issues
are taken from ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm). Company names and ticker symbols are retrieved from the Thomson
Reuters Worldscope database. For the Japanese companies, custom mnemonics are used instead of the numerical
ticker symbols of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The sample includes 176 cat bond issues.
Firm Ticker Symbol No. of issues Firm Ticker Symbol No. of issues
ACE American Insurance Co. ACE 3 Lehman Re LEHMQ 3
Aetna Life Insurance Company AET 4 Liberty Mutual LBH 5
AGF AGF 1 Mitsui Marine & Fire MMF 1
Allianz SE ALV 7 Mitsui Sumitomo MS 1
Allstate Corp. ALL 2 Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co. MSI 1
Amlin AG AML 1 Montpelier Re Holdings MRH 1
Argo Re AGII 2 Munich Re Group MUV2 15
Aspen Insurance Holdings AHL 1 Nissay Dowa General Insurance NDW 1
Assurant Inc. AIZ 3 Platinum Underwriters Holdings PTP 1
AXA S.A. CS 3 PXRE Group AGII 2
Catlin Group CGL 3 SCOR SE SCR 9
Chartis AIG 4 Swiss Reinsurance Company SREN 68
Chubb Group CB 3 The Cincinnati Insurance Company CINF 1
Converium AGP 1 Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance TMNF 2
Endurance Speciality Holdings ENH 1 Travelers Companies TRV 2
Flagstone Reinsurance Holdings FSR 3 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company FG 2
Hannover Re HNR1 3 Vesta Fire Insurance Group VTAIQ 1
Hartford Financial Service Group HIG 5 XL Mid-Ocean Re XL 1
Hiscox HSX 1 Zurich American Insurance Corporation ZURN 6
Kemper KMPR 1 Zurich Insurance Company ZSA 1
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Appendix III: Variable definitions and data sources.
The appendix presents definitions as well as data sources for all dependent and independent variables that are used in
the empirical study. The insurer characteristics were retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream and
Thomson Worldscope databases. The country control variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator (WDI) database. Data on cat bond issues are retrieved from the website www.artemis.bm.
Variable name Definition Data source
Dependent variables
SRISK Average annual estimate of the Systemic Risk Index as proposed byAcharya et al. (2012)
and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The SRISK estimate for insurer i at time t is given by
S RIS Ki,t = k
(
Debti,t
) − (1 − k) (1 − LRMES i,t) Equityi,t where k is a regulatory capital
ratio (set to 8%), Debti,t is the insurer’s book value of debt, LRMESi,t is the long run
Marginal Expected Shortfall defined as 1 − exp(−18 · MES ), MES is the dynamically
estimated Marginal Expected Shortfall and Equityi,t is the insurer’s market value of equity.
Datastream, Worldscope
(WC03351, WC08001),
own. calc.
MES Dynamic Marginal Expected Shortfall as defined byAcharya et al. (2010) and calculated
following the procedure laid out byBrownlees and Engle (2012).
Datastream, own. calc.
ΔCoVaR Conditional ΔCoVaR as defined by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), measured as the
diﬀerence between the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a country-specific financial sector index
conditional on the distress of a particular insurer and the VaR of the sector index con-
ditional on the median state of the insurer. As state variables for the computation of
conditional ΔCoVaR, we employ the change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, the
diﬀerence between the ten-year Treasury Bond and the three-month Treasury bill rate,
the change in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury bill rate, the
return on the Case-Shiller Home Price Index, and implied equity market volatility from
VIX.
Datastream, Chicago
Board Options Exchange
Market, Federal Reserve
Board’s H.15, S&P, own.
calc.
Insurer characteristics
Total assets Natural logarithm of an insurer’s total assets at fiscal year end. Worldscope (WC02999).
Market-to-book Market value of common equity divided by book value of common equity. Worldscope (WC07210
and WC03501).
Leverage Book value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity, divided by
market value of equity (see Acharya et al., 2010).
Worldscope (WC02999,
WC03501, WC08001),
own calc.
Investment activity Ratio of the insurer’s absolute investment income to the sum of absolute investment in-
come and absolute earned premiums.
Worldscope (WC01002,
WC01006), own calc.
Investment success Ratio of the insurer’s investment income to net revenues. Worldscope (WC01001,
WC01006), own calc.
Non-policyholder liabili-
ties
Ratio of the total on balance sheet liabilities minus total insurance reserves (including ben-
efit and loss reserves, unearned premiums, policy and contract claims and other reserves)
to total liabilites.
Worldscope (WC03351,
WC03030), own calc.
Net revenues Log value of total operating revenue of the insurer. Worldscope (WC01001).
Return on assets Return of the insurer on its total assets. Worldscope (WC08326).
Performance Buy-and-hold returns of an insurer for the period from -252 to -20 days relative to the
announcement date (%).
Datastream, own. calc.
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Appendix II: Variable definitions and data sources. (continued)
Variable name Definition Data source
IFRS Integer from one to 23 coding a firm’s accounting standards according to Worldscope
Database.
Worldscope (WC07536)
Loss ratio Ratio of claim and loss expenses plus long term insurance reserves) to earned premiums. Worldscope (WC15549).
Board size Natural logarithm of the number of directors on an insurer’s board. ESG ASSET 4 (CGB-
SDP060).
Board independence Percentage of independent outside directors on the board of directors. ESG ASSET 4 (CG-
BSO07S).
Debt maturity Total long-term debt (due in more than one year) divided by total debt. Worldscope (WC03251
and WC03255).
Previous issues Number of previous cat bond issues undertaken by the insurer. Artemis.
Frequent issuer Dummy variable that equals one if the issuer has issued five or more cat bonds during the
observation period and zero otherwise.
Artemis.
Cat bond characteristics
Issue size Value of an issued cat bond scaled by the ceding insurer’s book value of equity (%). Artemis.
Maturity Maturity of the cat bond in months. Artemis.
Indemnity Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the cat bond has an indemnity trigger and
zero otherwise.
Artemis.
Secured risk Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the cat bond securitizes mortality-related
risks or medical benefit claims and zero otherwise.
Artemis.
Rating The initial bond rating of the cat bond issue converted to a scale between 1 (best rating)
and 19 (no rating). We follow Hagendorﬀ et al. (2011) and convert the rating of an issue
to a numerical value by assigning a value of one to issues rated AAA by S&P (or Aaa by
Moody’s), two to issues rated AA+ (Aa1), and so forth.
Artemis, Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s.
Country characteristics
GDP growth Annual real GDP growth rate (in %). WDI database.
Inflation Log of the annual change of the GDP deflator. WDI database
Political stability This indicator measures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent actions. Indicator ranges from
(-2.5) to (2.5). A higher indicator values indicates greater political stability.
WDI database.
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index computed as the sum of the squared market shares of a coun-
try’s domestic and foreign insurers.
WDI database.
Anti-Director Rights In-
dex
Anti-Director Rights Index of La Porta et al. (1998) as revised by Djankov et al. (2008)
and Spamann (2010). The ADRI takes values from 0 to 5 with a higher value meaning
better shareholder rights.
Spamann (2010).
Reinsurance prices Guy Carpenter Rate On Line Index. The index is calculated by dividing global catastrophe
reinsurance premiums by global catastrophe reinsurance limits.
Guy Carpenter.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Size and number of catastrophe bond issues.
The figure shows the development of the total size and the number of catastrophe bond issues per year across our
sample. The data are taken from ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm) with the sample covering the time period between
December 1st, 1996 and April 1st, 2013.
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Table I: Summary statistics
The table presents summary statistics for the data used in our empirical analysis. The dependent variables represent
changes in SRISK, MES and ΔCoVaR around cat bond issue dates. Variable definitions and data sources are provided
in Appendix III.
Obs. Minimum Maximum 5 % Quantile 95 % Quantile Mean Median Standard
deviation
Dependent variables
- SRISK (in billions) 151 -24.97 69.37 -7.38 7.57 0.25 0.00 8.08
- MES 151 -0.8101 0.1209 -0.0510 0.0252 -0.0104 0.0003 0.0736
- ΔCoVaR 151 -0.1242 3.7813 -0.0353 0.0650 0.0344 0.0002 0.3159
Insurer characteristics
- Total assets (in billions) 151 0.90 1,350.21 2.55 921.17 207.82 143.94 269.88
- Market-to-book 151 -0.76 4.50 0.02 2.38 1.22 1.20 0.76
- Leverage 151 0.08 126.34 1.82 27.23 10.13 5.65 16.35
- Investment activity 151 -0.18 0.46 0.03 0.30 0.16 0.15 0.08
- Investment success 151 -0.15 0.58 0.03 0.28 0.15 0.14 0.08
- Non-policyholder liabilities 151 0.08 0.77 0.10 0.64 0.29 0.26 0.14
- Net revenues (in billions) 151 5.57 8.15 6.02 8.09 7.31 7.44 0.56
- Return on assets 151 -19.71 10.20 -2.26 5.29 1.21 1.18 2.62
- Performance 151 -0.77 0.62 -0.37 0.41 0.02 0.03 0.24
- IFRS 151 1.00 23.00 1.00 23.00 7.32 3.00 9.16
- Loss ratio 126 0.32 1.76 0.51 1.06 0.85 0.84 0.22
- Board size 125 8.00 20.00 8.00 19.00 11.94 11.00 2.97
- Board independence 103 2.73 94.40 6.81 93.10 77.03 83.41 22.38
- Debt maturity 150 0.00 1.00 0.11 1.00 0.82 0.85 0.21
- Previous issues 151 0.00 65.00 0.00 59.00 15.61 5.00 19.71
- Frequent issuer 151 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.46
CAT bond characteristics
- Issue size 151 6.00 550.25 11.00 400.00 153.17 134.00 118.36
- Maturity 84 12.00 71.88 18.00 48.00 37.39 36.00 9.69
- Indemnity 151 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.27
- Secured risk 151 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.24
- Rating 151 5.00 19.00 8.90 19.00 13.76 13.00 3.55
Country characteristics
- GDP growth 151 -5.13 5.28 -3.53 4.16 1.76 2.42 2.04
- Inflation 151 -1.25 8.10 -0.68 3.32 1.31 0.83 1.48
- Political stability 150 0.04 1.39 0.04 1.39 0.90 1.03 0.40
- HHI 149 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.01
- Anti-Director Rights Index 151 2.50 5.00 2.50 5.00 3.05 3.00 0.53
- Reinsurance prices 142 70.00 255.00 98.00 235.00 153.07 145.00 37.94
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Table II: Systemic risk changes around cat bond issues.
This table shows average diﬀerences in three diﬀerent measures of systemic risk (SRISK (in $ million), MES and
ΔCoVaR) around cat bond issues for the full sample of cat bond issues. The table includes the estimates for the
three measures of systemic risk in the 180-day period before the announcement of the cat bond issue (pre-issue), the
period after the issue (post-issue) and the diﬀerence between the two. Data on the cat bond issues are taken from
ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm) with the sample covering the time period between December 1st, 1996 and April 1st,
2013. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix III. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote estimates that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
N Systemic risk measure Pre-issue Post-issue Diﬀerence
159 SRISK (in $ million) 7.854 8.051 0.196
(0.753)
162 Dynamic MES 0.053 0.044 -0.009*
(0.092)
162 ΔCoVaR -0.020 0.013 0.032
(0.180)
Table III: Systemic risk changes of issuers and matched non-issuing insurers around cat bond
issues.
This table shows average diﬀerences in three diﬀerent measures of systemic risk (SRISK (in $ million), MES and
ΔCoVaR) around cat bond issues for issuing insurers and matched non-issuing insurers. Issuers and non-issuers are
matched using propensity score (p-score) matching based on their (log) total assets. The table includes the estimates
for the three measures of systemic risk in the 180-day period before the announcement of the cat bond issue (pre-issue),
the period after the issue (post-issue) and the diﬀerence between the two. Data on the cat bond issues are taken from
ARTEMIS (www.artemis.bm) with the sample covering the time period between December 1st, 1996 and April 1st,
2013. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix III. P-values are given in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote estimates that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Issuer Matched non-issuer Issuer vs. non-issuer
N Systemic risk measure Pre-issue Post-issue Diﬀerence Pre-issue Post-issue Diﬀerence Diﬀerence P-score
121 SRISK (in $ million) 8.249 8.241 -0.008 7.837 8.113 0.276 0.284 -0.001
(0.992) (0.714) (0.778) (0.408)
119 Dynamic MES 0.059 0.048 -0.011 0.067 0.051 -0.016** -0.005 -0.002
(0.150) (0.044) (0.178) (0.103)
110 ΔCoVaR -0.017 0.026 0.043 -0.019 -0.019 0.000 -0.043 -0.001
(0.229) (0.986) (0.229) (0.223)
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Table V: Regression of the diﬀerence in a Cat bond issuer’s exposure and contribution to systemic
risk.
This table shows results from the cross-sectional regressions of the diﬀerences in three diﬀerent measures of systemic
risk around Cat bond issues. The dependent variables are the diﬀerences in the issuers’ SRISK (in $ million), Marginal
Expected Shortfall and ΔCoVaR. Variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix III. Model (1) rep-
resents our baseline regression in which we employ the issuers’ total assets as an explanatory variable. Model (2)
additionally employs the issuers’ loss ratio and substitutes total assets by leverage and investment activity. Model (3)
adds our two corporate governance variables instead of the loss ratio to the regression. All models are estimated with
OLS. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-test statistics are shown in parentheses. ***,**,*
denote coeﬃcients that are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable SRISK MES ΔCoVaR
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Insurer characteristics
Total assets 1.187 0.024 -0.002
(0.871) (1.342) (-0.344)
Market-to-book -1.838* -0.985 3.660 0.018 0.003 -0.008 0.005 0.340** 0.254**
(-1.747) (-0.877) (1.287) (1.096) (0.754) (-0.696) (1.653) (2.221) (2.076)
Leverage 0.129*** 0.241*** 0.000 0.000 0.010** 0.003*
(3.104) (2.730) (-1.304) (-1.362) (2.098) (1.956)
Investment activity -7.518 -33.683* 0.018 0.172** -0.955 -2.117*
(-0.451) (-1.805) (0.543) (2.246) (-0.912) (-1.737)
Non-policyholder liabilities 4.622 3.213 11.723 -0.080* 0.005 -0.134** 0.020 -0.894* -0.097
(0.391) (0.236) (0.826) (-1.672) (0.275) (-2.233) (1.448) (-1.775) (-0.511)
Return on assets -0.189 -0.089 -1.486** 0.006 0.001 0.007* 0.001** -0.020 -0.097*
(-1.255) (-0.350) (-2.145) (1.256) (1.189) (1.696) (2.112) (-1.440) (-1.814)
Performance -7.155 -5.812 -10.719* 0.021 0.028*** 0.021 -0.054* -0.175** -0.113*
(-1.470) (-1.171) (-1.890) (1.523) (2.671) (1.326) (-1.971) (-2.101) (-1.812)
IFRS -0.251*** -0.214** -0.264 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.0003 0.023** 0.012
(-2.888) (-2.515) (-1.499) (0.801) (3.017) (1.411) (0.679) (2.121) (1.315)
Loss ratio 2.541 -0.004 -0.550*
(0.447) (-0.273) (-1.845)
Board size 0.297 -0.004 -0.035*
(0.466) (-1.156) (-1.740)
Board independence -0.039 0.000 -0.003
(-0.767) (-0.213) (-1.366)
Previous issues -0.045 -0.029 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006** 0.007*
(-1.079) (-0.749) (0.985) (0.885) (1.084) (-1.363) (1.144) (2.233) (1.668)
Panel B: Cat bond characteristics
Issue size 0.019*** 0.009** 0.011* -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000
(3.346) (2.002) (1.915) (-1.765) (-1.413) (-1.839) (0.086) (-1.718) (-0.271)
Indemnity 2.110** 5.013** 6.814*** -0.008 -0.012* -0.020 0.004 0.049 -0.085
(2.077) (2.281) (4.215) (-0.546) (-1.721) (-1.591) (0.613) (0.556) (-0.777)
Rating -0.080 -0.004 0.110 0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 0.000 0.009 0.004
(-0.549) (-0.029) (0.668) (0.898) (-0.520) (-0.664) (0.224) (1.211) (0.775)
Secured Risk -4.457** -2.247* -0.493 0.031* 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.236* 0.117*
(-2.271) (-1.703) (-0.240) (1.956) (0.917) (1.628) (0.579) (1.678) (1.915)
Panel C: Country characteristics
GDP growth -0.786*** -0.810*** -0.923* 0.002 0.002** 0.005** -0.005*** -0.028** -0.012
(-3.018) (-2.657) (-1.695) (0.909) (2.320) (2.214) (-4.439) (-2.173) (-0.552)
Political stability -0.440 1.516 -1.500 -0.041 -0.014 0.012 -0.014 -0.132 -0.359*
(-0.162) (0.715) (-0.495) (-1.108) (-1.654) (0.937) (-1.617) (-1.135) (-1.941)
HHI -158.854* -152.334* -75.565 1.351 0.772** -0.499 -0.169 8.592 -0.685
(-1.710) (-1.812) (-0.407) (1.224) (2.463) (-0.723) (-0.934) (1.370) (-0.111)
Anti-Director Rights Index -0.851 0.866 -3.124 0.029 -0.007 0.0002 0.006 0.664** 0.674**
(-0.465) (0.520) (-1.115) (1.305) (-1.622) (0.012) (1.465) (2.142) (2.104)
R2 0.236 0.254 0.400 0.151 0.256 0.332 0.248 0.565 0.671
adj. R2 0.148 0.134 0.270 0.053 0.136 0.187 0.161 0.494 0.600
number of observations 148 124 102 148 124 102 148 124 102
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